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Abstract 
This study reports the results of interviews with 65 managers in 11 German 
headquarters and in their 13 Hungarian subsidiaries. We focused on the role of the 
subsidiary with regard to market, product and value-adding mandates. Further, we 
investigated whether the Hungarian subsidiaries had experienced an upgrade of their 
role during the first 10 years of transition. The host country economy was supportive to 
role development, but inadequate subsidiary capabilities and headquarters’ assignments 
prevented the subsidiaries from being upgraded. We propose that the corporate immune 
system, ie, ethnocentric behaviours emanating from the headquarters should be included 
in future upgrading analyses. 
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Subsidiary Upgrading? Strategic Inertia in the Development of 
German-owned Subsidiaries in Hungary 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines German-owned subsidiaries in Hungary during the first 10 years 
of transition and questions how far and for what reasons the subsidiaries are in a 
position to upgrade their role in multinational corporations (MNC)1. Former surveys, 
conducted in a West European context, have revealed that some subsidiaries have 
upgraded their role over time with regard to market, product and value-adding activities 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1997; Delany, 1998; Egelhoff et al, 1998; Hood et al, 1994; 
Jarillo & Martinez, 1990; Pearce, 1999; Taggart, 1998, 1999; Williams, 1998).  
The purpose of this paper is to question whether the same degree of upgrading has 
occurred in a Hungarian context. Taking the point of departure in White and Poynter’s 
(1984) subsidiary role hierarchy, we define upgrading as a subsidiary going upwards 
from a lower level role to a new higher-level role. One example could be a subsidiary 
over the time developing from a marketing outlet to a strategic independent unit; being 
responsible for product development. Our data, acquired through 65 interviews in 11 
German headquarters and in their 13 Hungarian subsidiaries, though showed a much 
lower rate of upgrading when compared to former surveys. Even though market 
opportunities were promising, inadequate subsidiary capabilities on the one hand and 
the German headquarters ethnocentric behaviours on the other resulted in a lower 
                                                 
1 This paper presents some results from an empirical research project on "Exogenous Influences in path 
dependent transformation processes" funded by the Volkswagen foundation. M. Fichter (Free University,  
Berlin), L. Neumann, (National Labour Centre, Budapest) A. Tóth (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Budapest) and M. Wortmann (WZB,Berlin) cooperated in the procces of data collection. 
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upgrading rate. Consequently, the two latter mentioned reasons led to insufficient 
allocation of needed resources and reluctance to give the Hungarian subsidiary the 
authority to make decisions and act upon them. Thereby, this paper introduces the 
concept of ‘corporate immune systems’ as an influencing factor in upgrading surveys.  
We proceed with the following steps. We begin by summarizing reasons for 
subsidiary upgrading. In succeeding sections, we discuss methodological issues and 
examine the 13 case studies. Finally, we conclude and discuss implications for 
management practices.  
 
2. Subsidiary upgrading factors 
White & Poynter (1984) grouped subsidiary roles into five main categories and their 
classification has since been a central reference point for several upgrading studies 
(Hood et al, 1994; Delany, 1998; Taggart, 1999). White & Poynter (1984) differentiated 
between subsidiaries according to three criteria: 1) market scope, ie the number and 
extent of geographical markets the subsidiary is involved in, 2) product scope, ie the 
sum and scope of product markets the subsidiary engages in and finally 3) value-adding 
scope, ie the value adding activities available to the subsidiary, eg development, 
production or marketing. Based on these criteria, the authors described five different 
roles that the subsidiary can play. Marketing satellites are those subsidiaries, which 
market single products or a whole range of products in the host country and that provide 
only limited customers services. Miniature replicas not only deal in the foreign country, 
but also manufacture single or range of products, or a variety of products for the parent 
company there. Rationalised manufacturers produce individual products or product 
ranges for the world market. Other MNC units carry out R&D, marketing or necessary 
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production steps. Product specialists have comprehensive responsibility for a product 
within the MNC, since they develop and manufacture the product and sell it worldwide. 
Finally, strategic independent units have, in addition, the freedom to develop and 
manufacture new products and to set up new markets. Beyond these five roles, Schmid 
(2000) has shown the existence of a large number of incommensurable role typologies; 
though they will not be investigated further in this study.  
 
Several researchers have brought the changes in such roles over time into focus 
emphasizing the extent and reasons for upgrading. Hood et al (1994), Delany (1998) 
and Taggart (1999) all used White & Poynter’s (1984) terminology to analyse role 
changes, ie the transformation of the subsidiary from one role to another. Hood et al 
(1994) found three upgrades in a sample of 16 Japanese-owned Scottish subsidiaries. 
Delany, (19982) reported 19 upgrades out of 28 foreign-owned (US, UK and Sweden) 
subsidiaries. Finally, Taggart, (19993) saw 33 upgrades in a group of 131 US or 
European-owned UK-based subsidiaries. Further, Jarillo & Martínez (1990) and Taggart 
(1998) have tested upgrading in relation to Porter’s (1986) ‘coordination-configuration’ 
framework and both articles reported increases in the subsidiaries internal integration 
with other MNC units. Operating with his own definitions of market and product 
mandates, Pearce (1999) established the fact that within different groups of subsidiaries, 
upgrading took place in between 13 % and 21 % of the cases (190 UK-based 
                                                 
2 Delany modified White & Poynter’s typology by using a rationalised operator role instead of a 
rationalized manufacturer, encompassing product development. Product specialists in Delany’s survey 
were not totally autonomous. Finally, a new role was introduced: the enhanced mandate, defined as ‘one 
that does not have control of the entire value chain of a business unit but has activities in a number of 
parts of the value chain’ (p. 246). 
3 Taggart also modified the typology.  The marketing satellite and miniature replica role were united into 
(1) miniature replicas with no or some R&D and (2) miniature replica with substantial R&D. The 
 
 
6
subsidiaries). Furthermore, Egelhoff et al (1998) operated with three development paths 
for 16 Irish-based subsidiaries. Five aggressive subsidiaries built up unique value-
creating resources and gained strategic responsibilities; four incrementally developing 
subsidiaries only gained extended product positions and finally, the remaining (status 
quo) subsidiaries did not widen the scale and scope of their activities. Williams (1998) 
concentrated his survey of 452 UK-based subsidiaries on whether these had changed in 
respect to the number of value-creating activities and autonomous-based actions and he 
discovered changes in 44% and 52% of the cases respectively. Furthermore, Walsh et al 
(2002) took out the survey in a Chinese context and experienced that 66 North 
American or Asian-based subsidiaries in China had extended the scope of market 
activities in 56% of the cases. Recently, Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy (2003) provided a 
specific insight into the improvement of acquired firms in the former German 
Democratic Republic and Hungary, but did not look into role changes per se. The 
authors presented nine Hungarian case-studies in which only one subsidiary had been 
upgraded to be a global centre of excellence for R&D. 
  
This overview gave rise to the following kinds of questions: To what degree do 
subsidiaries change their role over time and why and when do they change? Which 
organisational and institutional structures cause these effects? Investigating prior 
surveys a pattern stood out where explanations to upgrading were to be found in host 
country factors, ie the local market economy and the actors related to this market, 
subsidiary resources, ie resource-based characteristics of the upgrading subsidiary and, 
finally, MNC organisational and structural factors, which included specific 
                                                                                                                                               
strategic independent and product specialist-oriented subsidiaries were pooled into a strategic mandate 
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circumstances regarding both the configuration of the MNC and headquarters 
behaviours. Birkinshaw & Hood (1997) also found evidence for this tripartition. The 
following paragraphs present a discussion of the three factors.  
 
Subsidiaries are likely to upgrade when the host country’s level of development 
improves because of the spill over effects derived from governmental subsidies and 
improved market opportunities. One ‘classic’ example is the development of Canadian 
subsidiaries. White & Poynter (1984) investigated Canadian subsidiaries and described 
a development from market-oriented to more production-oriented and strategically 
independent units. This development was caused by spill over effects from the Canadian 
governments improvements of the host country’s level of development to avoid 
negative effects of a high proportion of US ownership in the Canadian industry; early 
documented by Safarian (1966). Rugman & Douglas (1986) provided an example of 
such a spill over effect showing how subsidiaries benefited from the introduction of 
better management training programmes. Egelhoff et al (1998) described how the Irish 
government initiated development programmes targeting, for example, physical 
infrastructures and universities and, thus, indirectly supporting the technological 
development in foreign-owned subsidiaries. Further, Walsh et al (2002) pointed out how 
improvements in the Chinese economy provided the opportunity for subsidiaries to be 
upgraded, because the subsidiaries focused on developing internal capabilities instead of 
seeking cost efficiencies by utilizing low labour cost. Secondly, governments can also 
directly influence subsidiary strategies through subsidies and tax concessions 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1997). Thirdly, improvements of the host country’s economic 
                                                                                                                                               
role. 
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stage level of development typically improve market conditions and, in consequence, 
offering the subsidiary, more opportunities for establishing business relationships 
(Ivarsson, 2002, Delany, 1998, Ferdows, 1997) and, as shown by Egelhoff et al (1998), 
utilising new sales opportunities helped the subsidiary to grow and start up research 
processes. In relation, Holm et al (2003) showed how access to skilful personnel 
combined with pressures from local competitors and customers had a positive effect on 
the subsidiary’s ability to develop capabilities.  
 
The subsidiary’s stock of resources and capabilities, and their administration, have 
determined the development of firms – as argued through the resource-based view 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993): starting with Penrose’s (1959) pioneering work, which 
demonstrated how the growth rate of a firm was constrained by its reservoir of resources 
and how these resources were administrated. The resource-based theory has later been 
used to establish the conditions for sustained competitive advantage. For instance 
Barney (1991) theorized the need for resources to be value adding, rare, and hard to 
imitate and substitute. Christensen (2000) pronounces such rare and value-adding 
resources as capabilities. Capabilities have been described as being many-facetted, 
containing both the individual skills of employees and the organizational routines and 
learning processes (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Capabilities such as specialized 
technologies (Egelhoff et al., 1998), product portfolios (Hood et al., 1994), managerial 
expertise (Rugman & Douglas, 1986), entrepreneurial efforts (Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1997) and especially internal R&D processes have been central in upgrading processes 
(Pearce, 1999; Florida, 1997; Taggart, 1998).  
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Finally, the role of subsidiaries is not only the result of environmental influences and 
the capabilities available to the subsidiary, but also an outcome of headquarters’ 
strategy and the autonomous stage of the subsidiary (Morrison & Roth, 1993). Egelhoff 
et al (1998) provided the insight that headquarters’ assignment was central for the 
subsidiaries’ evolution. However, headquarters’ willingness to allocate the subsidiary 
the needed resources and strategic responsibilities for upgrading has been depending on 
several conditions. When headquarters’ home markets matured or its technological 
advantages disappeared, a need for corporate resource reallocation was created 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1980; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). In relation to this, Delany (1998) 
showed that the closing down of one subsidiary - in some cases - would result in the 
upgrade of another subsidiary. Therefore, changed market conditions, poor 
management, etc, elsewhere in the MNC gave headquarters an incentive to reconfigure 
resources and strategic responsibilities. These strategic redeployments have been either 
parent-driven (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) or subsidiary-driven (Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1997; 2001). Furthermore, the product, market or industry area in which the subsidiary 
obtained its mandate, is also been dependent on the headquarters own interest and 
qualifications. D´Cruz (1986) explained the subsidiary’s ease of achieving strategic 
responsibilities in, for instance, obscure products with limited global prospects. To win 
mandates was more difficult if headquarters had taken a stake through heavy investment 
in the particular product. Finally, autonomous-based strategic positions has helped 
subsidiaries to position themselves in relation to other subsidiaries, to build up 
capabilities through internal R&D processes and to tap into external networks not 
accessed by other units of the MNC. Autonomy can be seen as an outcome of an 
evolutionary process where capital, technology and management skills have become 
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vested in subsidiaries, thus establishing a space in which the subsidiary can develop 
without impact from headquarters or other MNC units (Prahalad & Doz, 1981). Some 
case studies have pointed towards this relationship between autonomy, initiatives and 
upgrading (Egelhoff et al, 1998; Delany; 1998; Ferdows, 1997).  
 
3. Data collection and methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
The data collection started with a comparison of around 194 German investments in 
Hungary, representing one half of all German foreign direct investments in this 
country4. Out of these 194 subsidiaries, 13 cases were selected for a more detailed study 
of the upgrading processes. These cases on the whole represented the main structural 
features present in the total sample with regard to: the size of the German investors 
(mainly small and medium sized enterprises, the choice of sectors (mainly labour 
intensive sectors), the type of market entry (mainly acquisitions), the basic market 
orientation (both home market and export orientation) and the size of the Hungarian 
subsidiaries (both large and small subsidiaries)  
 
Interviews were carried out in these companies between 1999 and 2002; both at the 
German headquarters (or at the divisional headquarters supervising the Hungarian 
subsidiaries) and at the Hungarian subsidiaries. Interview partners, either acquired by 
the cascading or the snowball approach (Welch et al 2002), were usually top managers 
of the Hungarian subsidiary, including both expatriates and inpatriates together with the 
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executive responsible for the subsidiary at the headquarters or the owner, in case of 
some small or medium-sized enterprises. In total, we interviewed 65 managers: twenty-
six of the interviews took place in the headquarters, 36 in the Hungarian subsidiaries 
and three in competing subsidiaries. Furthermore, we conducted 10 stakeholder 
interviews, for example with representatives of the German Chamber of Commerce in 
Hungary or with a representative of the investment promotion agency. In some cases, 
telephone follow-ups took place. Interviews were semi-structured using an interview 
questionnaire. Interviews usually lasted an hour and a half, they were taped, transcribed 
and integrated into individual short cases studies. In these case studies document 
information was integrated. Information given in the interviews was basically 
triangulated in interviews carried out elsewhere in the same MNC and in stakeholder 
interviews and document data. Case studies were sent back to one interviewee (usually 
our ‘sponsor in the company’) for correction and additional information. In about half 
the cases feedback meetings with several interview partners took place. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
German MNCs owned the 13 Hungarian subsidiaries surveyed. In two of the cases 
examined, the same German firm took the ownership of two different Hungarian 
subsidiaries. The sample, therefore, included 11 German MNCs and 13 of their 
subsidiaries. Six of the German MNCs employed between 600-5,000 individuals. 
Another group of four MNCs had between 25,000 and 42,000 employees. Finally, one 
MNC consisted more than 200,000 employees. In the last case, two subdivisions were 
investigated, employing 5,000 and 39,000 individuals respectively. Nine of the MNCs 
                                                                                                                                               
4 In terms of the overall employment at German subsidiaries in Hungary as given by the Deutsche 
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operated within the manufacturing industry. Four of the German firms had only located 
production sites in Germany and Hungary. Two other MNCs had placed production 
sites regionally in Europe and finally, the remainder produced globally. Two firms 
within the service industry were globally oriented.  
The Hungarian subsidiaries employed between 150 and 1,100 individuals. In this 
sample, the mean was 501 employees, with a standard deviation of 287. The German 
MNCs acquired eight of these Hungarian subsidiaries, whereas the remainder was 
greenfield establishments. The German companies took the ownership in between 1989-
1997. Nine of the subsidiaries exported their products. Local executives managed five 
of the subsidiaries, German expatriates led five other subsidiaries, and in the last three 
cases we observed a shared management between German and Hungarian executives.  
4. Main Empirical Findings 
4.1 The cases 
ELEC5 has more than 400 employees and operates within the electro mechanic 
industry. Main products are sensors for machine tools. The subsidiary started out and 
has remained as a rationalized manufacturer. In 2002, the subsidiary took care of some 
R&D activities for new products - but not enough to be judged as a product specialist, 
since no innovative research took place. R&D activities were mainly process-oriented 
and involved only six people. However, production activities in ELEC grew in volume 
and further the subsidiary introduced high-tech manufacturing machines and 
                                                                                                                                               
Bundesbank (2003) 
5 All names are pseudonyms in order to maintain anonymity 
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technologies (such as “chip on board-technology” or “SMD pick and place-technology) 
that were not implemented in headquarters. 
TELE, conducts its business within the telecommunications equipment industry and 
employs 250 people. This company began as a miniature replica, with a local market 
focus and an assembly oriented product scope, and since has conducted applied R&D 
activities  while adapting headquarters technology to Hungarian market requirements 
(for example in fast internet access-technology). In 2002, the subsidiary was 
downgraded to a marketing satellite when production activities were closed down. 
However, before this closure there was marked progress in production activities and in 
the technological level of the activities performed. 
The third case was SOFT. This company is located in the communications software 
industry, employs 500 people and is owned by the same MNC as TELE. SOFT was 
founded initially as a rationalized manufacturer and has remained in that role within its 
main activities. However, the entity has initiated R&D activities and created capabilities 
within very narrowly defined technologies (for example in core processing) and 
products requested by particular Hungarian customers. This indicates a role change 
towards a product specialist, though, within an obscure activity. The role change is 
seemingly partial, since the headquarters still monitors strictly whether the subsidiary 
fulfils its rationalized manufacturing mandate.  
ERP functions within the ERP-Software industry, and has 150 employees. ERP was 
established as a marketing satellite and has remained in that position ever since. The 
predominant task is to market headquarters products to the local market, though some 
activities in production adaptation towards local regulatory requirements have been 
initiated. Follow-up consulting services such as on line trouble shooting have been 
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extended, which might lead to a future upgrading within this specific area. Otherwise, 
the subsidiary is likely to continue to operate primarily as a marketing satellite.  
The fifth case is ITSERV that provides IT services and employs 300 people. The 
subsidiary started as a miniature replica following acquisition. However, in 2002, a 
regional innovation centre focusing on the convergence of information and 
telecommunication technology was founded and headquarters decided to upgrade the 
role of the subsidiary in the direction of a product specialist. The R&D unit initially 
employed 50 people but is planned to provide work for 250 people. 
AIR is active in pneumatic technology and employs 320 people. AIR was launched as 
a product specialist having corporate-wide responsibilities within specific product lines 
(air preparation devices used in process control). From the beginning AIR also acted as 
a rationalized manufacturer for the production of some auxiliary components. Although 
an increase in production and enhancements in the technological level of production and 
R&D activities performed took place during the investigation period, the subsidiary 
retained the role as a rationalized manufacturer. 
FOOTW1 is in the footwear industry with 850 employees. This subsidiary 
commenced as a rationalized manufacturer since all R&D, procurement, logistics and 
production planning occurred at the headquarters. As in the other cases described, no 
upgrading in role came about even though the scale of activities has increased (for 
example part of the logistics has been relocated from the headquarters) Further, the 
subsidiary undertook part four (production of travel prototypes) and five (development 
of process technology for mass production) in a five-phased R&D process. 
Headquarters then decided to relocate part three (production of coloured prototypes) to 
the subsidiary. In general, production enhancements have taken place.  
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FOOTW2 is owned by the same MNC as FOOTW1. The subsidiary employs 1,100 
people. The subsidiary’s development path was quite similar to FOOTW1 despite only 
slight improvements in technology and the quality level of production. FOOTW2 won a 
mandate for the production of kid shoes and thus extended the product scope. However, 
due to a market slump, inefficient production at the subsidiary and unprofessional 
marketing management at the headquarters, this mandate was managed unsuccessfully. 
Headquarters then decided to close down the subsidiary in 2003 and to relocate parts of 
the production to FOOTW1. 
The next case presented is MOTOR that produces electrical motors for household 
appliances and employs 620. Since its acquisition in 1992, the subsidiary has played the 
role of a rationalized manufacturer. The scale of activities has, however, increased 
tremendously; for example production volume doubled in the years from 1999 to 2001 - 
as a result of further relocations from headquarters. Today, the subsidiary faces threat of 
a closure due to cost driven reconfiguration of the production in the MNC. 
KNIT is involved in the knitwear industry and has around 450 employees in the 
production of high quality pullovers. The subsidiary was a true rationalized 
manufacturer since all R&D, marketing, logistics, distribution, purchasing, production 
planning and steering functions were located in the headquarters. Technicians sent from 
the headquarters even maintained the machines. The subsidiary still plays the role of a 
rationalized manufacturer, though it is approaching the product specialist role, but 
without being responsible for particular products per se. However, increases in the 
production volume, quality and flexibility have been seen; further, the subsidiary 
introduced more advanced technologies in production processes. Finally, additional 
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tasks in R&D (for example the production of prototypes) have been assigned to the 
subsidiary. 
Case number 11 is CLOTH, a subsidiary that operates in the work clothing industry 
and employs 380 people. This case again showed the stability of the rationalized 
manufacturing role. All value added activities besides production have been done from 
the German plant. Despite the fact that during recent years some marketing tasks in the 
Hungarian market were mandated to the subsidiary, headquarters of this family owned 
company still controlled marketing activities for the Hungarian key customers. There 
has been no upgrading in role, but again increases in the production volume, technology 
and quality took place.  
PLAST operates in the plastic packaging industry for consumer goods and employs 
270 people. This subsidiary, which was built up as a state of the art greenfield plant, can 
be characterized as a product specialist - though with a restricted market scope – 
producing and marketing for the European market. A dedicated R&D unit in Germany 
carried out basic R&D. Also major process innovations were transferred from Western 
European or US sites. This has not been changed since the establishment of the 
subsidiary.  
The final case is CEMEMT, a cement producer employing 550 workers and staff. This 
subsidiary played the role of a miniature replica, producing for the local market. Basic 
R&D was done in a specialised German-located R&D unit. Furthermore, major process 
innovations - such as the creation of plant wide maintenance units - were transferred 
from Western European or US sites. Subsequent to the acquisition, major investments 
were made both in the modernization of the production and in environmental protection 
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equipment. Again, production volume and quality have increased dramatically, but there 
was no upgrading in role. 
 
4.2 Upgradings? 
Departing from White & Poynter’s (1984) terminology, the Hungarian subsidiaries 
were not able to make substantial role shifts, measured as going from one role to 
another. Seven subsidiaries remained in their role as rationalized manufacturers (ELEC, 
SOFT, FOOTW1, FOOTW2, MOTOR, KNIT and CLOTH), two continued their role as 
miniature replicas (ITSERV and CEMENT), two went on as product specialists (AIR 
and PLAST) and one stayed in the role as a marketing satellite (ERP). The remaining 
subsidiary (TELE) even faced a downgrading in role, from a miniature replica to a 
marketing satellite. However, most of the subsidiaries were able to extend their scale of 
production and marketing activities and substantially increase the quality and flexibility 
of their production or service delivery. To explain this simultaneous inertia in role but 
upgrading in scale, flexibility and quality in Hungarian subsidiaries, host country 
factors, issues related to subsidiary capabilities and MNC structural factors are 
subsequently discussed. 
 
Host country factors were the primary cause of the changes that took place in those 
subsidiaries where a marked expansion and improvement of operations was observed. 
Governmental policy and access to local knowledge were supportive to improvements 
of the subsidiaries’ operations, whereas increased labour cost sometimes was an 
obstacle to development. One important host country factor was the liberal investment 
regime of central government including huge tax alleviations, the right to declare any 
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company premises a special economic zone and different kinds of direct subsidies for 
the creation of workplaces6. In some instances, local government had been supportive to 
subsidiary activities. In the TELE-case, where the subsidiary for an interim period 
improved its productive and technological level, the local authorities showed their 
willingness to help the subsidiary to earn a European mandate for a specific product line 
by signalling that they would allow large scale production in a predominantly 
residential area. Another important host country factor explaining the strong increase in 
the scale of operations at Hungarian subsidiaries was relatively low labour costs. 
Increasing labour costs, due to the overvaluation of the Hungarian currency Forint and 
due to the rise in the minimum wage was, however, seen as a major problem for the 
development of some subsidiaries. Such was the case in MOTOR that had built its 
competitive advantage exclusively on cost efficiency. In another case (AIR), the rise in 
labour costs probably prevented a further expansion of economic activities while in the 
cases of FOOTW1 and FOOTW2, parts of the production processes were relocated to 
cheaper locations in Asia and other Eastern European plants. On the other hand, access 
to labour that was simultaneously cheap and skilled (compared to Western European 
standards) was vital for development in the SOFT and the ITSERV cases. In both 
situations, headquarters decided to locate innovative activities in Budapest hosting the 
highest level of technical education in Hungary. Furthermore, relationships established 
to local universities, like in the SOFT case, were supportive to development. Here, an 
outpost in Szeged was founded in order to bypass the labour market shortages for 
engineers in Budapest. Secondly, the subsidiary cooperated with the Szeged University 
                                                 
6 This is also supported by two comparative studies of the Economist Intelligence Unit In both studies, (1) 
on the costs of doing business and (2) on the quality of the business environment, Hungary was among 
the leading countries (Economist Intelligence Unit, cited according to OECD 2002: 113-4)  
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to draw on resources that were outside the functional needs of the MNC. Collaborating 
with this association helped the company to develop its technological capabilities. 
ITSERV also established close connections to the Budapest Technical University. 
 
While host country factors were by and large supportive to upgrading, inadequate 
subsidiary capabilities in combination with strategic inertia were determining causes for 
the ineffectiveness in upgrading. In many cases, the subsidiaries missed the opportunity 
to develop resources that were value-adding, rare, inimitable or hard to substitute, 
compared to the rest of the MNC. PLAST, being a product specialist, lacked the size 
and the technological potential to develop into a strategic independent unit. The same is 
true for AIR, the second product specialist in our sample. In both cases, achieving 
satisfactory performance in production consumed most resources. However, in one case 
(SOFT), the subsidiary possessed state of the art technological knowledge and within 
minor areas, it employed the leading experts within the MNC. However, lack of 
headquarters’ assignment and fierce MNC internal competition prevented an upgrading 
in role. In particular, subsidiaries with a strongly restricted value adding activity scope - 
such as the rationalized manufacturers - lacked basic lobbying skills and/or an effective 
access to the headquarters: in many cases the managers of these subsidiaries had no or 
only little knowledge of who the key actors were in headquarters’ decision processes, 
relevant decision criteria or which management fraction in the headquarters supported 
which position. Frequently, interviewees in headquarters also stressed insufficient 
organizational capabilities in the Hungarian subsidiaries as impediments to subsidiary 
upgrading.  
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A second determining cause for the strategic inertia of Hungarian subsidiaries was the 
MNC structural factors – one example is the headquarters decision of allocating 
resources. MNC-wide reconfigurations were observed in the cases of MOTOR, KNIT, 
ELEC and CLOTH, where headquarters relocated production from Germany to 
Hungary, but this did not lead to allocating of more demanding steps in the value chain 
(such as R&D) - potentially triggering a change in role. Furthermore, even though the 
relocation of production was the initial reason for settling down in Hungary, the 
relocation was done stepwise: Headquarters eagerly governing whether the subsidiary 
met quality and performance standards.  
 
Only in three cases (ERP, ITSERV and FOOTW2), were autonomy and managerial 
initiatives, two basic structural preconditions for a subsidiary-led upgrading, present 
simultaneously. In ERP, a strong entrepreneurial initiative was demonstrated in order to 
develop centres with specific responsibilities. Secondly, the subsidiary attempted to 
position Hungarian employees in leading projects worldwide. Thirdly, subsidiary top 
management desired to improve ERP to be a know-how centre. In this case, managers 
in the subsidiary reported enough room and resources to develop strategies on their own 
within the mandate given. Managers in the ITSERV subsidiary also showed 
considerable initiative to promote upgrading and headquarters assigned the needed 
autonomy to develop independent strategies. In the case of FOOTW2, headquarters’ 
managers felt that subsidiaries were much uncontrollable, which demonstrated 
autonomy. Nevertheless, the local managers here won a specific product mandate. 
Later, headquarters closed down FOOTW2, mainly for reasons, which lay beyond the 
subsidiary’s influence. In the three cases, the combination of managerial initiatives and 
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autonomy to build up new insights helped the subsidiary to develop towards upgrading, 
though an upgrading in role was not achieved during the time of our inquiry. In other 
cases (such as SOFT), a high degree of managerial initiatives were shown, but the 
needed autonomy was not granted from headquarters7.  
 
This leads to the question of why did several of the German headquarters show such a 
strong absent in assigning autonomy and mandates to their Hungarian affiliates? 
Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999) have suggested the corporate immune system as a 
reason for absenting assignments. Here, headquarters opposes subsidiaries proposals 
because of strict funding criteria, bureaucratic inertia or due to political reasons. 
Sometimes the subsidiary becomes a victim of the Not-Invented-Here syndrome (Katz 
& Allen, 1982). In many cases investigated, the German headquarters showed 
ethnocentric attitudes towards the Hungarian top managers: in one case, they were 
disparaged as the ‘mafia’ or ‘old socialists’. In another case the German owner stated: 
‘all Hungarians only want to become rich without working and thus must be tightly 
controlled’. Here, the German owner found it too risky to transfer crucial elements, such 
as production planning, to the Hungarian subsidiary. In other cases, resources and 
mandates stayed at headquarters, even when sites in Hungary were considered as being 
better equipped to perform certain tasks. In yet another case, a subsidiary, run by 
inpatriates, could not overcome jalousies from their sister subsidiary in Hungary, which 
was run by German expatriates. Large investments in logistics, originally planned for 
                                                 
7 It further turned out, that only local managers/inpatriates advocated initiatives for a change in role. Most 
of the expatriated managers took no such initiatives. The pros and cons of using expatriates instead of 
inpatriates have not been an issue in previous upgrading studies. Our results pointed towards the fact that 
the use of inpatriates favoured subsidiary upgrading. However other surveys, for example Blazejewski & 
Dorow (2003), have spoken for expatriates leading upgrading processes.  
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the subsidiary, managed by the Hungarian managers were finally made at the subsidiary 
managed by expatriates. 
5. Conclusions and discussions 
Upgrading of German-owned Hungarian subsidiaries has only taken place to a limited 
degree and mostly in terms of scale, quality and flexibility of operations. Even though 
the external environment was generally supportive, the subsidiaries were not able to 
develop the needed capabilities for a role shift. The main reason why was to be found in 
absenting headquarters assignments and in ethnocentric German behaviour. We, 
therefore, suggest that future research should include investigations of slackness in 
subsidiary development. One question to address is the importance of the corporate 
immune system for lack of upgrading. A second question is the weight importance of 
the three pillars supporting subsidiary role changes, ie host country factors, subsidiary 
capabilities, and MNC structures. Further, the interrelatedness of the three factors needs 
to be established.  
 
We foretell a future upgrading of especially SOFT, ERP, ITSERV and KNIT. Coming 
from different roles, these subsidiaries have the potential to upgrade to product 
specialists. On the one hand, these firms have not made a role shift in respect to White 
& Poynter’s (1984) categorization, in view of the fact that all three above-mentioned 
factors were not simultaneously present. On the other hand, subsidiaries were able to 
evolve when only some of the needed conditions were in place. SOFT established 
unique relationships to the local environment, developed capabilities, and managers 
took initiatives. However, headquarters decided so far not to assign the needed 
autonomy and resources for upgrading. ERP was also a very initiative-oriented firm and 
 
 
23
lived rather uncontrolled, but lacked the efficiency in using the local market or start up 
internal procedures, to create capabilities. KNIT showed a promising development, even 
without local economy support or through initiatives taken, but headquarters was in this 
case ready to assign future mandates. ITSERV was the case where headquarters decided 
to place a Regional Innovation Centre. This case came closest to the current theoretical 
understanding of why subsidiaries upgrade, though this subsidiary’s superiority rather 
had to be found in its external relationships to local counter partners rather than internal 
in the firm. 
 
The fact that we chose to collect data in a very narrowly defined context limits our 
findings. Several studies have revealed the fact that headquarters’ national origin 
influenced the development path of subsidiaries (Taggart, 1999; Pearce, 1999; Delany, 
1998; Hood & Taggart, 1999). The absence of assignment might in our sample be an 
outcome of the dyadic relationship and the related narrow national context investigated. 
 
This leads us to the managerial implications of our study. Examples of Hungarian 
subsidiaries being upgraded through headquarters assignment do exist, such as Nestlés 
plans to disperse new roles to its Hungarian subsidiaries as a preparation for Hungary 
joining the EU. Centre of competences will here be established, based on the know how 
of the factory in Szerencs/East Hungary (Oláh, 2003). A similar case is the Audi plant 
in Györ/West Hungary. Based on an initial success of a small car engine production, the 
headquarters of Audi assigned the worldwide mandate for all engine production of Audi 
to the Györ plant. Furthermore, a mandate was handed over to Györ for the assembly of 
the high-end roadster Audi TT (Keune/Tóth 2001). Despite these individual cases of 
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headquarter assignments an important question remains: what Hungarian managers can 
do to support an upgrading in role of their firms? This is an especially pressing question 
since rising wages, an increasing labour market shortage together with a deterioration of 
the investment regime due to Hungary’s EU-accession8 means for many Hungarian 
subsidiaries today to upgrade or to die. In this situation, Hungarian subsidiary mangers 
have to simultaneously following two strategies. For one they must convince their 
headquarters that the subsidiary is capable to perform tasks beyond manufacturing. 
Secondly, since 2002 through subsidies governments has tried to attract R&D and have 
further promoted human capital formation by modernizing its educational sector. This 
shift in the investment regime has to be actively promoted at the headquarters by the 
Hungarian subsidiary managers since - as we pointed out earlier - Hungary still has the 
reputation of being a low cost agrarian country, which is burdened by corruption and 
bureaucratic red tape. The second strategy to be simultaneously followed by Hungarian 
subsidiary managers is to make use of new government programs that aim at a gradual 
deepening of linkages between domestic suppliers and MNC subsidiaries in Hungary. 
These programs encompass matchmaking activities, technical and financial support to 
do business with foreign subsidiaries, hand-in-hand with subsidies for the co-operation 
of Hungarian research centres with foreign subsidiaries in Hungary. Integrating or 
developing Hungarian suppliers can be a way to support internal knowledge creation 
processes at foreign subsidiaries, which might be effective in building up capabilities 
and autonomy, needed for the gain of headquarters mandates. 
                                                 
8 With the EU accession the generous tax concession the Hungarian government used give, will be 
abolished. The same is true for the right to declare any plant a free-trade zone (OECD 2002).  
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